Attrition of scientists from DRDO not hampering R and D work: Govt

Good joke by our defence minister, seriously he also knows well that his replies are always from non-technical pov to the babus he is replying to and we all know how the babus are versed regarding defence sector :rolleyes:

DRDO’s main problem is attrition: Natarajan
11 February 2007
http://www.domain-b.com/aero/20070211_natarajan.htm

Bangalore: The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is facing a major manpower crunch, thanks to poaching from Bangalore’s burgeoning IT sector, DRDO chief M Natarajan feels. He said that that attrition is a much bigger problem for his organisation than financial constraints.

“My biggest concern is getting engineers and designers of the right quality,” Natarajan, who is also the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, told Domain-B on the sidelines of the ongoing Aero India 2007 air show at the Yelahanka Airforce Base in Bangalore.

Compared to the IT companies, remuneration packages in DRDO units are abysmally low, Natarajan complained. To make matters worse, IT companies are located very close to the DRDO’s units in Bangalore, Hyderabad as well as Pune. The current attrition rate in the DRDO is a staggering 20 to 27 per cent, he disclosed.

http://www.barc.ernet.in/publications/nl/2007/200707-1.pdf

Report on MMR from BARC Newsletter for July 2007

Any comments from experts?

Firstly, Another good joke by Prasun Sengupta, When will force learn to write something other than rumours and presss reports? The whole report is so bloody erroneus that it presents totally different hooligan picture.

Yes one more time IRBIS is a AESA, LRAAM JV with Brazil, MMR to MMRski AESA to litening 3 to reprogramming of DFCC and CLAW :rolleyes: wah!

Is this because IAF still feels that LCA’s induction might be further delayed?

No, this is how the agreement will be done, the requrement was always for more aircrafts, the deal will include the clause of more aircrafts to prevent any cost escalation issue that may rise later, check the issue related with Su 30 40 more deal.

Now that seems a lot more than strange.
Please correct me if im wrong, but it seems to me that Ind-China ties have been warming up for sometime. There trade ties are growing with some limited exercises also on the way. With regard to any boundary issues, there is a kind of comfortable status quo. China is busy with its Taiwan issue while trying to keep its economic growth stable, and under these circumstances there is almost no chance of any chinese misadvanture in those areas. OTOH, India is also growing at a rapid pace, and needs China on its side with regard to nuclear staus getting through NSG as well as semi/permanent SC seat at some point in future.

And now this???
Could anyone more learned in indian matters please make a head or tail of this?

China has made some flying rocket like comments in not so recent past regarding AP, Kalaikunda has been going through a HUGE overhaul to make it a base where exercises will be held, diversifying MKI’s makes sense in that scenario any sort of ties not-withstanding.

Broncho, Inverted commas in that article imply direct quotes and not mere journalistic interpretation. Unless of course AVM has been misquoted completely as happens in media, my questions still stand.

Normally such comments are out of context, I’m sure with or without the chinese threat, there needs to be some good fighters in the eastern front, while DGCA has increased heavy traffic in Pune, eastern sector so far is relatively free to host a few squadrons.

Sorry guys, but for me this is no suprise :rolleyes:. India and Russia will always have close ties no matter how far delayed any project gets. Sure India wants Western equipment due to its obvious superiority, but because the Russians will always offer good equipment for very low prices, there is no one to blame except the Indians themselves.

This is not a matter of equipment from Russia/West, This is a matter of Russians not delivering what they wanted too heck even the Trentons price was a bit escalated, the delay of 3 years is quite a lot and by any means IN should make Shevmash answerable and liable for their issues. Its fault on both sides for us going for it in the very beginning (although 10 years before we didnt had much options) and for them not living up to what the term was done to. Our bureaucracy has killed thousands of things, killing the home industry and doing what not There is a nice article recently appeard in Op-Ed in Asian Age by Admiral Arun Prakash the former recently retired Chief of Naval staff who has spearheaded and started many many projects inhouse.

I openly expressed my disatisfaction over this gorshkov deal, I say cancel the whole project since IAC will arrive by 2012~13 or so, Cancel the mig 29K’s buy something else over the money, and NDB should get its act together with UK/France for the CVF design and get it built as per its own requirements being the IAC 2.

Gorshkov delay can be a boon
By Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd)

According to reliable media reports, the delivery of the former Red Navy helicopter-VTOL carrier, Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuz Sergei Gorshkov, “gifted” to India, and undergoing an extensive repair-cum-modernisation programme in the Russian port of Severdovinsk, is likely to be delayed substantially. Notwithstanding the understandable optimism of the Indian Navy (IN), it appears that the ship, to be renamed INS Vikramaditya, may not join our fleet before end-2009.

This is by no means a catastrophe, and the IN has enough inherent flexibility and adroitness to overcome operational or planning voids, if any, that this delay may create. It is understood that the Navy’s Gorshkov project is not the only one in jeopardy, and the Russians are also creating unforeseen difficulties in other areas like the Sukhoi-30 strike-fighter and the AWACS early-warning aircraft contracts, considered by India as signed and sealed; and therefore inviolate by international norms.

The negotiations for Gorshkov modernisation were possibly the most detailed, torturous and protracted parleys ever conducted by a joint Indian Navy, Indian Air Force and ministry of defence (MoD) team. After de-commissioning from the Soviet Navy, the ship had been lying idle in port for many years, and the contracting shipyard had all the time to assess the scope and the magnitude of the work involved in this challenging undertaking. Notwithstanding this, an aircraft-carrier being a complex ship, the MoD, in an unprecedented concession, had allowed a certain percentage for unforeseen work or cost overrun. Now it seems, in a blatant breach of contract, the Russians not only want more money, but also more time for completion of work.

No Indian can forget the unstinting assistance and steadfast support rendered to us by the USSR for the first few crucial decades of our Independence. But let no one imagine that it was a one-way street. Those of us who visited Russian shipyards and aircraft plants in the Nineties can never forget the stark sight of silent production lines, unfinished hulks, and idle workers playing cards in un-heated sheds. Many Russians gratefully acknowledge that it was Indian orders for military hardware (and generous infusion of hard cash) during this difficult juncture that saved many critical industries from bankruptcy and breathed life into Russia’s stagnant economy.

The current situation of the Indian armed forces vis-à-vis Russia is akin to a man standing with both feet in quicksand; the more he decides to stand firm on one foot, the more his other foot sinks into the quagmire. The dilemma is of our own making, and should serve as a rude wake-up call for our national security managers. Equally, it should remind the political establishment of Lord Palmerston’s adage about a nation’s “permanent interests” taking precedence over friends or allies. Some enduring lessons emerge from these developments, which are generic in nature, and fall under four heads.

Firstly, we must fortify our bargaining positions by undertaking a drastic review of our strategic “bottom lines.” If our diplomats (and the military) can assure us of five-ten years of peace, it will provide us a breathing spell to mobilise our latent capacities and consolidate our indigenous strengths. This is exactly what China is doing right now. Moreover, when we buy goods worth tens of billions dollars from a country, we must learn to use this tremendous lever to our advantage. Once we make hard-headed assessments, we will find that we can take uncompromising stands, and break debilitating strangleholds, so that we do not remain hostage to one country or another. For example, the USSR did indeed make an unprecedented gesture by leasing us a nuclear attack submarine in 1987, but two decades down the line, we need to look back and assess the tangible benefits we actually derived from this melodramatic but expensive and much misunderstood initiative.

Secondly, we must craft a strategic vision and bolster it with quick decision-making. Our home-grown warship design and building capability is one of the few success stories in an otherwise bleak scenario. In an attempt to capitalise on it, since the late-Eighties the IN had been persistently badgering the government to approve the indigenous construction of an aircraft-carrier. Having delayed, dithered and prevaricated as much as they possibly could, the bureaucracy finally recommended, and the government approved, the indigenous aircraft carrier or IAC, in 2003. The order was placed the following year, and work has commenced, somewhat hesitantly, in Cochin shipyard. If we are very lucky, we may have an IAC by 2014-2015. The larger point that emerges is, that had we shown strategic vision and approved this project in 1990, we need not have bothered with a second-hand ship like Gorshkov, or re-entered the Russian maw at all.

Thirdly, we must escape the deadly grip of the international arms bazaar, which is ruled not by friendships but by greed and ruthlessness. No sooner has the ink dried on the contract, that the thumbscrews are turned on: escalating costs, uncertain availability of spare-parts and tardy product support result in grounded fleets and undermined security. From time to time we have made ineffectual noises about indigenisation and self-reliance, but little has changed on the ground because the import option is not only easier but much more lucrative for many important actors. Indigenous development and production, as well as resolute mobilisation of the private sector in this cause are issues that impinge on the roots of our national security and are deserving of attention and action at the highest levels of governance.

Finally, let us streamline the DRDO. It needs to be understood that India’s claims to being a great power or even an industrialised nation will ring hollow unless we can acquire the competence and skills to design and produce our own tanks, fighters, ships, submarines, missiles and satellites. For all their shortcomings and past blunders, the DRDO has often made us proud, and it is only DRDO that can help the nation scale the technological heights that it aspires to. This organisation has led a sheltered existence, without accountability or responsibility, and has thus fallen prey to the twin failings of hubris and inflexibility. Defence R&D delivers far more efficiently and effectively in countries like Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom, and we should not be too proud to emulate their strong points, wherever necessary.

It is indeed an “ill wind that blows no good,” and our current difficulties with Russia can turn out to be a boon if they lead to an agonising re-appraisal in the right quarters.

Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) is a former Chief of the Naval Staff

Is it more plausable that the Chinese are able to make the perfect missile that will not err from the course of a lazer beam and they were able to factor in and accurately calculate every possible outside factor that might affect the course of a missile; or is it more likely that the Chinese were able to guide a normal missile to fly through a <3m2 spot in orbit?

So what do you think the satellite launchers does? Injects the satellite in a specific orbit with absolute precise orbital inclination and with precise predefined injection in its apogee and perigee. Do you know they dont even makes a error of 0.0x degrees in these above cases for a precise launch and injection?

What do you think will happen When instead of the satellite what you inject is a homing vehicle, in the same orbit that of the other satellite moving?

Dont tell me the satellite is making zig zag manuevere and your homing vehicle is chasing it like that like a AAM does. The fact is Intercepting Ships, (I’m never saying China cannot do that because in my book there is no cannot) is much harder than doing satellites in a pre-defined orbit and trajectory.

apparently the article that speaks of more jet is from Hindustan Times (HT) and after clicking the link it appears some sort of problem with their archives? It is a report from 2006…:D

Not a single report is to be taken as so called ‘authentic’, I hate saying and repeating the same line over and over for some folks, Whatever the media reports will not be outcome of the ultimate decision.

We have nothing to do other than guess and wait. period.