TomcatViPThis makes me recall an incident at BNFL about 12 years back when a set of fuel rods were delivered to Japan. There was a process of measurement whereby the rod geometry was precisely measured twice. One day after delivery an extremely bored undergraduate on a placement scheme was looking through these measurements and unwittingly commented to his boss, “Wow, these measurements are really precise and consistent, both sets are exactly the same.” Bearing in mind that these measurements were in nanometres, his boss replied, “No *LOL* you’re reading it wrong,” and took a look. Rumour has it that he turned sort of a pale white and started trembling at this stage. Shortly afterwards he made a call to his boss, who called his boss’s boss etc. until the CEO was rang.
The CEO after probably considerable deliberation called Japan. The rods were removed from the reactor and returned to the UK by ship. The CEO who had nothing to do with it was forced to resign and heavily unionised culprits remain at large somewhere in the nuclear industry.
In this case a product was withdrawn simply on the basis that there was a small chance it could be wrong. Someone had been lazy and only measured the rods once and then copy and pasted the results instead of measuring again. In all likelihood the rods were fine but no one was prepared to take that risk.
This is a really good narration to illustrate the problem. Thx for sharing Lukos.
Without going further down with that problem on an aviation related forum, as I have written before, that kind of criminal behavior are completely off-range of the radar set of law enforcement agencies. And when they come down to justice court, it’s far too late to revert the effect or too embarrassing for those involved. This has led to a favorable effect for this to increase at an even faster pace.
Don’t take me wrong, this has always been in place in the industry but nowadays we see a multiplication of this behavior. Everybody will agree or nod silently on that.
Without a dedicated corp of law enforcement agency (yes, your read it right: embedded Investigators), backed by an appropriate engineering support on the early phase, the prob will remain strong and detrimental to innovation.
TomcatViPDo you realize that they have been a victim of a fraud ?
Most of their on-the field data are probably invalid (don’t know when the fraud did begin). Most fatigue-life calculations are probably out.
But I agree that asap, a short explanation regarding what was the extend of the fraud will be welcomed if that is not too sensitive.
May I remind you that lately we’ve seen two major program scraped due to the non-conformity of items delivered: the Spartan for the USAF and the NH90 for the NhAF. I don’t hear such loud crying in the press and the results are far more hair-raising
TomcatViPThe Rus ATC clearly saw the plane falling apparts:
[ATTACH=CONFIG]231615[/ATTACH]
Source:
http://www.safetyboard.nl
@Mercurius: Thx for the clarification. Much needed.
TomcatViPAt least the family could have the assurance that the death of their relatives were not in vain:
On 29th July 2014 ICAO […] regarding the risk to civil aviation in conflict zone […]:
-Immediately establish a senior level task force […] to address the civil aviation and national security aspect
Regarding the preliminary results, I am still confused about the fact that they did not recover a single piece of evidence for the “foreign objects” having penetrated the plane.
This is really hard to believe. Any shrapnel evidence will give with a certain degree of certainty the type of missile and manufacturer. Public are expecting for that kind of evidences.
Also, a good meteorological sat view of the zone of the crash at the time of impact is given depicting the solid overcast. This is a good point for the comprehension of the events.
TomcatViPTomcatViPAny link to the published report ?
TomcatViPReading that thread while seating inside the Pentagon will be certainly the most unwise decision of all.
Frankly that bullying campaign around re-starting the 136 is insane. The 136 concept did not work for the application needed with the 35. Numerous iterative improvement have been conceptualized since long and the answer is the 135. That’s it.
And frankly, with nearly 30000shp on the shaft available to generate electricity, the 135 concept is the engine of tomorrow when the 136 was simply not.
TomcatViPbut h2k missile have other mean to control missiles other than their fin
That’s what basically I am trying to say 😉
TomcatViPWing area and Missile ?!?!!!
C’mon Andraxx, I thought we had that clear enough.
Look at them. Look at their fins. Look at the apparent section of their “airfoil”. Does it look like inviscid theo and low subsonic eq. can apply ? Does the H2K missiles employ large wings or thick airfoil ?
I didn’t read it all but Why do we have to write it that down again ?
TomcatViPGreat find MSphere. Quite interesting. Note that Portuguese Corsairs weren’t true A-7D but rather converted/rebuilt A-7A airframes with D and E avionics.
Does anyone have any more info besides this source? It says that it was offered in early-1980’s so was this photo taken in the US before delivery of this Corsair to Portugal?
Best regards,
There is no apparent registration on it so the aircraft had probably not fly at the time.
TomcatViP+1
Thx !
TomcatViPThx to remind us what are the daily suffering of the relatives. It give us the perspective needed to act with caution on the forum.
Let me pursue the Battery theory.
Here are a condensed of FAA regarding the problem with thermal runaway:
http://avherald.com/h?article=431f0863&opt=0
The FAA reports, that lithium metal batteries are highly flammable and capable of ignition. Ignition can occur when batteries are being overcharged, short circuits, is exposed to heat, is being mishandled or is otherwise defective. Once a cell is induced into thermal runaway by internal failure or external means (like heating or physical damage), it generates sufficient heat to cause adjacent cell into thermal runway, too. The thermal runaway of a lithium metal cell creates an even more severe event than the thermal runaway of a lithium-ion cell because the lithium metall cell releases a flammable electrolyte mixed with molten lithium metal accompanied by a large pressure pulse. The combination of electrolyte and molten lithium metal can result in an explosive mixture.
On top of that the current fire suppression agent Halon 1301 found in class C cargo compartments is inefficient in controlling a lithium metal cell fire.
The explosive potential of the lithium metal cell can perforate the cargo liners or activate the pressure relief panels in a cargo compartment causing the loss of Halon 1301 allowing a rapid fire spread within the cargo compartment.
For these reasons lithium metal cells are prohibited to be carried as bulk cargo shipments on passenger carrying aircraft.
it might no be related but…
Surveying the Aircraft incident report give more clue to this hypothesis with smell of burn in cabin and cockpit, loss of aircraft primary systems system or loss of consciousness in GA aircraft (TBM 900 and Cirrus)
Example:
….5th of sept : TBM900 + Thomas Cook A320 near Brussels on Sep 5th 2014, strange smell in cockpit and cabin
….4th of sept : Cirrus
…1st of Sept: Jetblue A320 over Atlantic on Sep 1st 2014, smoke in cockpit + burning smell
…31st of August: KLM Cityhopper F70 near Amsterdam on Aug 31st 2014, odour on board
… 27th of august: White AT72 at Lisbon, smoke in cabin + burning smell
…11th of April: A319 at Frankfurt, smoke in cockpit
… 8th of april: A319 near Cologne, Elmo’s fire and loss of all instruments
Li Battery are now integrated in avionics panel such as for example the L-3 Trilogy ESI-2000 backup instrument with integral backup battery in the TBM 900
The potentiality of a malfunction or a faulty quality of one of the cell is increased by the dissemination and multiplication of the number of battery. Satisfactory Environment control during the design is also a weak point with non-standardized implementation.
Sources:
http://avherald.com/
http://www.aopa.org/
http://www.saftbatteries.com/
TomcatViPDC-130 with some Ryan made RPV hanging under the wing
[ATTACH=CONFIG]231539[/ATTACH]
A close view of the massive pylon used also in other projects
[ATTACH=CONFIG]231540[/ATTACH]
And in operation over the gulf of Tonkin:
[ATTACH=CONFIG]231541[/ATTACH]
TomcatViPHotshot,
The engine core isn’t stiff enough due to the lower grade of material. It is subject to non-expected deformations at high temp and under a certain value of the plane acceleration. This compromises the tight adjustment btw the turbine (?) blades and the engine core resulting in higher friction, higher temperature, higher ablation of blade material and weakening of the blades.
No one as made the remark so far in the press, but the good news is that it is a non-catastrophic event in the sense that the life expectancy of the blades after being damaged that way is something around 3.5hr (the value cited as time btw inspection/removal).
That means that the fleet can be safely flown for the pilots .The limitation being there more to lower the burden on the logistic side.
TomcatViP(from the news thread)
Libyan MiG-21 crashed in Tobruk.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-03/three-dead-as-libyan-war-plane-crash-caught-on-camera/5715734
Horrible vid.
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