You can’t expect to have a discussion if you can’t explain what it is that you want to discuss.

Are you looking for someone to tell you the name of some article or book that you think you read in the past?

Or are you trying to discuss close air support in a historical context?

Or are you trying to discuss close air support in the context of today’s current battlefield?

You can begin by defining what you mean by CAS. I’ve actually flown CAS in combat in SEA. I’ve flown it in a peacetime European environment in both fast and slow movers. CAS as a concept is a slippery subject to get one’s hands around. Once your objective is defined, then we can move on to what may be the best way to achieve it. To give you an example…when I first started flying the A-10 in the early 1980s in Germany, the idea was that we would be employed to attack Warsaw Pact armor as it crossed into friendly territory…that was how CAS was defined then for the A-10…kill T-72s before they engaged NATO ground forces.

Neat idea…but not very survivable. The WP forces had a lot more T-72s than we had A-10s…trading one for one wasn’t a good idea. It didn’t take a rocket scientist to see that the best way to kill a T-72 was with another tank…or maybe a helicopter launched missile. By 1984, we had moved the A-10 employment area back a ways from the front lines.

I offer this perspective from my own experience…technology is nice but it often fails to survive first contact. Given the level of technology available today, engineers and engineering can come up with what seem to be really spiffy ideas. Unfortunately, they aren’t the folks who actually have to use these ideas when the s%$# hits the fan. Whenever some engineer tells me that his gizmo can do such and such, I’ll ask him if he is willing to bet his life on that…because he’s asking me to bet mine.

One comment on that article you posted…regarding “light cavalry” in a historical context. We have such a thing today, and it does the same things that the concept did back in the day when folks rode horses. Today we call it Stryker or Bradley, etc.

Once you define CAS, then define “organic”. Are you talking about the uniforms people wear (i.e., branch of service) or the chain of command for CAS assets or where these assets are based? If you think WW2 forces had “organic CAS” elements, what nation/service did you have in mind?

Sallam (peace) alfakilo,

I was actually looking for someone who had read about this in the historical context of WWII and German employment to recall something out of his reading that may have proved my point. I did read a few things about this before. One example that I recall reading was of Rommel in NA, combining his air assets which promptly became more concerned with winning the air battle first. I also recall some more information about Stuka’s being employed within various armored formations rather than as a separate air force on certain occasions.

I however find your conversation of much interest. I personally am of the opinion (and I haven’t flown any missions so you can rightfully reject this) that a higher form of employment is possible. Something I’d call “Air Cavalry” or “Combined Arms Air Component (CA-AC)”. What I mean by this are aircraft that are employed organic to a division, regiment or brigade to achieve the objectives of the formation through assault and defense from the air.

Some key salients:

– Employed organically (based along with the formation and not from air bases)
– Proactive engagements rather than attacking predefined targets

By organic I mean that they will be based within and contiguous to the military unit, will fall under their integrated chain of command and will thus be part of a single service as opposed to being an asset outside the service.

While I think that my theory is generally applicable, the specific context, if I had to choose one would be Pakistan.

Thank you for replying to my post. I see that you have a lot of depth of experience behind what you are typing. A few questions (and not criticism) I have for you are:

1. Why do you think helicopters are more survivable than an equivalent aircraft shooting those same missiles?

2. How much of a difference do you see in a Striker or a Bradley from an M-117? How much of a difference do you see in its mobility compared to an MBT?

3. Are IFVs a complement to your MBTs or a different paradigm?

4. How survivable do you think a platform as I have proposed in my article in modern conditions? Imagine within a Pak-India scenario.

5. Can such a platforms generally stay out of the air force battles (generally) or at least perform effectively without the said air force having air dominance (imagine an even a2a battle on top)

Looking forward to seeing your reply, thanks again.

Kind regards,

M. Hussain

PS:

I am envisioning a platform that not only performs CAS as is traditionally understood but also has a role in ISR, “recon by fire” and an anti-artillery role. This is not just about destroying tanks nor is it necessarily about using a gun to do so. In fact I’ve only proposed a 50 caliber. This is more of a missile launch platform. On that note, someone suggested a 20 mm cannon may be a superior choice instead.

I think there is an importance for modern military aviation thinkers to consider how CAS was employed in the earlier stages of WWII.

Anybody has any references?

I know the arguments for organic CAS and against it, as well as the CAS vs. Artillery arguments.

the lack of persistence and being on time to me is an issue of a number of factors that also includes (many miss this) a particular paradigm of technology use and a particular paradigm of military organization. There is also the issue of inter-service politics.